Game Theory

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Neil Patrick Harris portrays Carl Jenkins (featured in the banner image) in Starship Troopers (1997). Carl Jenkins demonstrates both a high mathematical intelligence as well as psychic-abilities which, when he signs up for Federal Service, lands him in Games and Theory: military intelligence (replete with SS-styled uniforms).

When I saw the Reading List and Final Exam for Games and Strategy used by Thomas Schelling in 1963. I grabbed it and copied it in full for ease of reference and added the links to the source papers. Coursework for Games and Theory!

Thomas Schelling joined Harvard Economics in 1958 and taught the undergraduate course “Games and Strategy” nine times during the 1960s. Below is the syllabus and final exam from the first term of the 1963–64 academic year.

Related materials from his “Economics and National Security” that he taught in 1960 and from his 1970 course “Conflict, Coalition and Strategy” have been transcribed and posted earlier at Economics in the Rear-view Mirror.

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Course Announcement

Economics 135. Games and Strategy

Half course (fall term). M., W., F., at 10. Professor Schelling

Theories and experimental studies of rational decision in conflict, collusion, coalition, bargaining, collective decision, arbitration, and uncertainty.

Source: Official Register of Harvard University. Vol. LX, No. 21 (September 4, 1963): Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Courses of Instruction for Harvard and Radcliffe 1963-1964, p. 103.

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Economics 135
Games and Strategy
Fall, 1963

Reading Assignments

PART I. COPING WITH AN INTELLIGENT ADVERSARY

  1. Rapoport, Anatol: Fights, Games and Debates, Chapters 7, 8, 9; pages 130-165. (35 pages)
  2. Williams, John D.: The Compleat Strategyst, Chapters 1, 2; pages 1-85, and Chapter 3, pages 86-91 then scan rest of chapter. (91 pages)
  3. Hitch, Charles J. and McKean, Roland: The Economics Defense in the Nuclear Age, Chapter 10, “Incommensurables, Uncertainty, and the Enemy,” pages 182-205. (23 pages)
  4. Read, Thornton: “Strategy for Active Defense,” Papers and Proceedings of the AEA, American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 2, May 1961, pp. 465-471.
  5. Alchian, Armen A.: “The Meaning of Utility Measurement,” American Economic Review, Vol. 43 (March 1953) pages 26-50. (25 pages)

(OPTIONAL: R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, Chapters 1-4, pp. 1-87.)

PART II. COERCION AND DETERRENCE

  1. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, Chapters 1, 2, 5, 7, 8; pages 3-52, 117-161, 175-203. (121 pages)
  2. Ellsberg, Daniel: “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” (38 pages) mimeograph
  3. Schelling: “The Threat of Violence in International Affairs,” Proceedings, 57th Annual Meeting, American Society International Law. (INT. 16.8)
  4. Stevens, Carl M.: Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation, chapters 3 and 5, pages 27-56 and 77-96. New York: McGraw Hill, 1963.

PART III. MUTUAL RESTRAINT

  1. Kenneth: Conflict and Defense, Chapters 1, 2, 6, pp. 1-40, 105-122. (58 pages)
  2. Schelling: Chapters 3, 4, 9, 10; Appendix A; pages 53-118, 207-254, 257-266. (121 pages)
  3. Cassady, Ralph, Jr.: “Taxicab Rate War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, pages 364-8 (December, 1957). (5 pages)
  4. Valvanis, Stephan: “The Resolution of Conflict When Utilities Interact,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2 (June 1958) pages 156-69. (13 pages)
  5. Rapoport, Chapter 10, pp. 166-79 (14 pages)
  6. Boulding, Chapters 12, 13, pp. 227-73.
  7. Schelling: “War Without Pain and Other Models,” World Politics, XV, (April, 1963) pp. 465-487.

PART IV. COLLECTIVE DECISION AND ARBITRATION

  1. Farguharson, Robin: “Sincerity and Strategy in Voting,” mimeograph (February 5, 1955) (7 pages)
  2. Black, Duncan: “On the Rationale of Group Decision Making,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56 (February, 1948), pages 23-34 (12 pages)
  3. Steinhaus, Hugo: “The Problem of Fair Division,” Econometrica, Vol. 16 (January, 1948), pages 101-109. (9 pages)
  4. Dahl, Robert A.: A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chapter 2, pages 34-60, with special attention to notes 9 and 12, pages 42-43 and 43-44. (26 pages)
  5. Rapoport, Chapter 11, pp. 180-194. (15 pages)
  6. Rapoport, Chapter 12, pages 195-212. (17 pages)

PART V. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES

  1. Flood, Merrill M.: “Some Experimental Games,” Management Science, Vol. 5 (October, 1958) pages 5-26. (22 pages)
  2. Kaplan, Burns, and Quandt: “Theoretical Analysis of the Balance of Power,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 5 (July, 1960), pages 240-52. (12 pages)
  3. Schelling: Chapter 6, pages 162-72. (11 pages)
  4. Rapoport: Chapter 13, pages 213-25. (12 pages)

READING PERIOD

  1. Burns, Arthur L.: “A Graphical Approach to some Problems of the Arms Race,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, pages 326-42. (16 pages)
  2. Thibaut, John W. and Kelley, Harold H.: The Social Psychology of Groups, Chapter 7, pages 100-125. (26 pages)
  3. Goffman, Irving: “On Face-Work,” Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, Vol. 18 (August 1955), pp. 213-31.
  4. Twain, Mark, “The Man that Corrupted Hadleyburg,” in The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain.

Source: Harvard University Archives. Syllabi, course outlines and reading lists in Economics, 1895-2003. Box 8, Folder “Economics, 1963-64”.

We won the Cold War – listen to the results

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